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Highlights 
- Competing public long-term care (LTC) insurers have incentives for risk 
selection 
- Risk adjustment in LTC insurance is necessary to prevent selection 
- Risk adjustment may prevent selection based on prior use of LTC and medical 
care may prevent selection 
- Incentives for risk selection against some easily identifiable subgroups persist 
 
Abstract 
When public long-term care (LTC) insurance is provided by insurers, they typically 
lack incentives for purchasing cost-effective LTC. Providing insurers with appropriate 
incentives for efficiency without jeopardizing access for high-risk individuals 
requires, among other things, an adequate system of risk adjustment. While risk 
adjustment is now widely adopted in health insurance, it is unclear whether adequate 
risk adjustment is feasible for LTC because of its specific features. We examine the 
feasibility of risk adjustment for LTC insurance using a rich set of linked nationwide 
Dutch administrative data. Prior LTC use and demographic information are found to 
explain much of the variation, while prior health care expenditures are important in 
reducing predicted losses for subgroups of health care users. Nevertheless, incentives 
for risk selection against some easily identifiable subgroups persist. Moreover, using 
prior utilization and expenditure as risk adjusters dilutes incentives for efficiency, but 
using multiyear data may reduce this disadvantage. 
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1. Introduction 
All around the world, health policy makers are confronted with ageing populations 
and rising demands for long-term care (LTC) and are looking for ways to guarantee 
access to LTC services in a sustainable way. Barr (2010) argues there is a strong case 
for public provision of LTC insurance. And indeed, virtually all OECD countries have 
at least some publicly provided mandatory coverage against LTC expenditures. 
Several of these countries (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland and the US Medicare and 
Medicaid programs) have integrated some “medical” LTC services in their public 
health insurance schemes. Other countries, e.g. the Netherlands (since 1968), 
Germany (since 1995), Japan (since 2000) and South-Korea (since 2002), have a 
separate public LTC insurance scheme, Typically, if public LTC insurance is provided 
by public non-competing insurers, these agents are not at risk for the LTC expenses of 
their enrollees. As a consequence, these public insurers have no incentives for 
securing cost-effective provision of LTC services. Instead, governments have 
traditionally relied on demand rationing (e.g. copayments, coverage restrictions) and 
supply rationing (e.g. price regulation, provider budgets) to control expenditures in 
public LTC insurance (Costa-Font and Courbage 2012). Both types of rationing, 
however, have important drawbacks, which are likely to be exacerbated by the 
expected increase in demand for LTC. Demand-side rationing may result in access 
problems for low-income individuals who need LTC; supply-side rationing may result 
in waiting lists and substandard quality of care.  
 
An alternative or complementary strategy to increase the future sustainability of 
public LTC insurance is to provide public LTC insurers with incentives to foster 
efficiency and to control costs. To achieve this, public LTC insurers are made 
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financially accountable for the LTC expenses of their enrollees and consumers are 
empowered to choose the most efficient LTC insurer. Introducing consumer choice 
and financial risk for LTC insurers, however, is likely to result in premium 
differentiation or, if for equity reasons risk rated premiums are not allowed, risk 
selection. Consumer choice and financial risk may thus reduce horizontal equity in 
financing and access to LTC services. Furthermore, this situation may lead to welfare 
losses resulting from resources employed for risk selection rather than for improving 
care, result in inefficient health plans that nonetheless survive and bring about lower-
than-desired quality of care (van de Ven and Ellis 2000).  
 
These negative side effects may be mitigated by risk-adjusted premium subsidies that 
ensure that each potential enrollee is equally attractive for insurers
1
. The combination 
of risk-adjusted capitation payments, community-rated premiums, and open 
enrollment to ensure competition among risk-bearing insurers in social health 
insurance markets, is known as managed (or regulated) competition (Enthoven 1988, 
Van de Ven and Ellis 2000). Managed competition has become widespread in health 
insurance to balance efficiency and equity goals and knowledge on the prerequisites 
for its implementation in health insurance has been accumulated. .But managed 
competition has not been experimented with in LTC insurance yet. Only in countries 
where some (medical) LTC services are integrated within health insurance, i.e. 
                                               
1
 A system of risk-adjusted capitation payments will also be necessary if LTC 
insurance is carried out by regional single payers that are at risk for providing LTC to 
a defined population, e.g. regions/municipalities. But in this alternative scenario, a 
lower level of precision in predicting individual LTC expenses is required because 
risk selection is less relevant. Hence, the primary goal of these subsidies would then 
be to foster equity across regions or municipalities. 
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Belgium, Switzerland and the United States (Medicare), there is some experience with 
managed competition in LTC.  
 
While risk adjustment in health insurance has been studied extensively, empirical 
research on risk selection and risk adjustment in LTC insurance is nearly nonexistent. 
The aim of this paper is to examine how and to what extent a system of ex-ante risk 
adjustment subsidies can reduce the scope for risk selection in LTC insurance.
2
 The 
following five questions are addressed: (1) How do LTC expenditures differ from 
expenditures on medical care and how do these differences affect the options to use 
risk adjustment to reduce risk selection? (2) What are the predicted losses and gains 
on LTC in case of community rating and without risk adjustment? (3) To what extent 
are the predicted losses and gains reduced by the most comprehensive risk-adjustment 
model based on the available administrative data? (4) What is the contribution of i) 
demographics, ii) prior LTC use and iii) prior health care expenditures and inpatient 
hospital diagnoses to the reduction of the predicted losses and gains in the most 
comprehensive risk-adjustment model? (5) How are the predicted losses and gains 
affected when the risk adjusters that provide substantial perverse incentives from the 
risk adjustment model are removed? 
 
                                               
2 Definitions of LTC vary internationally. In this paper we focus on elderly care, 
which in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) accounts for the majority of total LTC 
expenditure covered by LTC insurance (CVZ 2011). Elderly care is defined as home 
care, social assistance, assistance with activities of daily living and inpatient stays in 
either a residential home or a nursing home. This definition comprises both “medical” 
and “non-medical” LTC: unlike in some other European countries, in the Netherlands 
there is no sharp distinction between medical and nonmedical LTC. 
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2. What is already known? 
Unlike in LTC insurance, in health insurance risk adjustment is widespread. But the 
experience from risk adjustment in health insurance cannot be readily used to develop 
an appropriate risk adjustment system for LTC insurance. LTC expenditures differ 
from health care expenditures (HCE) in at least two important aspects (Van de Ven 
2005). First, LTC expenditures are concentrated among a limited group of 
beneficiaries, and, conditional upon use, high and stable over time. These 
characteristics make risk selection based on prior expenditures much easier in LTC 
insurance than in health insurance in the absence of risk adjustment. Second, LTC 
expenditures do not only depend on the patient’s health and disabilities but also on the 
availability of informal care (see e.g. Bonsang 2009). The availability of informal care 
is difficult to quantify with administrative data and hence cannot be fully captured by 
the risk adjustment formula. 
 
Little is known about how these issues can be dealt with and about how to design 
appropriate risk adjustment for LTC insurance.. To date, there is only one study about 
the feasibility of risk adjustment in Dutch LTC insurance. Using prior LTC 
expenditure data from one sickness fund as a risk adjuster, Van Barneveld et al. 
(1997) examine the remaining potential for risk selection in the Dutch public LTC 
insurance scheme. They find an R
2
-statistic of 0.90, which indicates that LTC 
expenditures are highly predictable at the individual level when information on prior 
expenditures is available. However, using prior expenditures as a risk adjuster means 
that the insurer will be compensated (partly) for high(er) expenditures through higher 
future risk-adjusted capitation payments. This compensation is a major drawback 
because it lowers incentives for efficiency compared to the situation of capitation 
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payments that are not based on prior expenditures. Still, risk adjustment based on 
prior expenditures (or use) improves incentives for efficiency compared to the 
situation in which insurers are fully reimbursed for all costs if insurers compete on 
quality (Marchand et al. 2003). 
 
Several studies on risk adjustment in US Medicare have tackled similar issues. 
Medicare covers health care, rehabilitation care in a nursing home, and some home 
care services for the elderly and the disabled as part of a broader package of health 
insurance (CMS 2011). While the Medicare benefit package encompasses far more 
than just LTC insurance, the Medicare target group is similar and studies on risk 
adjustment in Medicare still provide a number of relevant insights. First, risk 
adjustment for private insurers that offer Medicare Advantage plans and receive a 
capitation payment for each enrollee is extensive and takes into account frailty as 
measured by the number Activities of Daily Living (ADL) problems for the Program 
of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE). The risk adjustment model without 
frailty is found to systematically underestimate expenditures for the frail elderly and 
might induce risk selection against this group (Kautter et al. 2009).  
 
Second, the relationship between health care use in the past, demographic 
characteristics and future health expenditures changes upon institutionalization and is 
different for those who were eligible for Medicare because of reaching the age of 65 
and those who were eligible because they were disabled (Pope et al. 2004). This 
finding implies that risk adjusters should be interacted with institutionalization and 
age to reflect nonlinearity. 
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Third, despite extensive risk adjustment, incentives for risk selection persist: while 
risk selection on expected costs decreased after expanding the risk adjustment formula 
beyond age and gender, insurers now select profitable enrollees by focusing on 
characteristics not included in the model. Consequently, the Medicare program has 
become more expensive and expenditures are transferred from those in bad health to 
those in good health (Brown et al. 2011). 
 
Beyond the US, experience with risk adjustment in LTC insurance is mostly limited to 
Switzerland and Belgium. In these countries, medical LTC is included in social health 
insurance. In Switzerland, the risk adjustment formula comprises age, gender and a 
dummy variable accounting for a recent stay of at least three days in a hospital or a 
LTC-facility (Von Wyl and Beck 2012). This dummy variable is likely to pick up 
some of the variation in expected LTC expenditures. The Belgian risk adjustment 
formula includes more specific risk adjusters for LTC. The capitation payment is 
adjusted for receipt of certain allowances (e.g. for handicapped or because of a need 
for assistance) or nursing care at home during 3 months (category B or C on the Katz-
scale (Katz and Akpom 1976)). The formula also includes a number of indicators 
related to LTC use, e.g. living alone, being widow/widower, physiotherapy for a 
severe illness, and Parkinson’s disease (Schokkaert and van de Voorde 2011). While 
the Belgian risk adjustment formula is more sophisticated than the one used in 
Switzerland, the financial risk for Belgian health insurers is much more limited 
(Schokkaert and van de Voorde 2011; Paolucci et al. 2007). So, incentives for risk 
selection against LTC patients appear to be large in Switzerland and very limited in 
Belgium. It is, however, unclear whether the more sophisticated Belgian model would 
suffice to prevent risk selection if financial risk for insurers were expanded. 
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3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
We use information from four nationwide administrative datasets and one survey 
which are all linked by Statistics Netherlands at the individual level (see de Meijer et 
al. (2011) for a more detailed description of the data). The administrative data include 
(1) health care expenditures in 2000-2004 from the health insurance data collected by 
Vektis; (2) LTC use in 2004 and 2005 from the Central Administration Office of the 
LTC insurance scheme (CAK); (3) hospital admissions in 2002, 2003 and 2004 from 
the hospital discharge register (LMR); (4) demographic information for 2004 from the 
municipal register (GBA) and (5) mortality from the cause-of-death registry (CBS). In 
addition, the General Survey of Living Conditions (POLS) held in 2004 provides 
details on health, disability, and other individual characteristics for a randomly drawn, 
representative sample of the non-institutionalized population. The administrative data 
sets comprise the entire Dutch population, except for prior health care expenditures 
which are registered for sickness fund enrollees only (two-thirds of the population)
3
 
and except for LTC use, which is registered for adults only (≥ 18 years of age). 
Furthermore, the records for one third of those eligible for sickness fund coverage 
cannot not be linked; item non-response on other variables was small (1.7% of the 
sample) and in all cases the result of missing co-residence status. As a result, the final 
sample consists of individuals who were insured through a sickness fund, did not die 
in 2004 and whose records could be linked to the municipality register. The total 
study population was 5,719,934, which is 45% of the Dutch adult population in 2004. 
                                               
3
 Until 2006 enrollment was mandatory for two thirds of the population with an 
income below a threshold; the remainder of the population was not eligible for social 
health insurance and could buy private insurance. By contrast, public LTC insurance 
was (and is) mandatory for the entire population. 
  11 
From this subset of the population, 7790 individuals were included in the 2004 POLS 
survey; 3619 of these respondents also completed the more specific health module.  
 
3.2 Methods 
We identify the extent to which a risk adjustment model can reduce incentives for risk 
selection in three steps. First, we identify the insurers’ incentives to select against 
subgroups based on individual characteristics in the presence of community rating but 
in the absence of risk adjustment. In order to quantify the insurers’ incentives for risk 
selection, we calculate the difference between the average actual costs by subgroup 
and the average costs of the entire population in 2005. We consider the incentives for 
risk selection to be strong when the number of users in the subgroup is substantial (> 
300), the predicted loss for this group  – the difference between observed and 
predicted expenditures – is large (> 1000 euro) and the predicted loss was 
significantly (p < 0.05) different from zero. When these criteria are met, the subgroup 
is included in the risk-adjustment model. 
 
Second, we build the full risk adjustment model in a stepwise manner to examine to 
what extent each set of individual characteristics contributes to explaining individual 
variation in LTC use. We first test the impact of a basic model based on demographic 
characteristics on the predicted loss for all subgroups. Next, we add subgroups based 
on (i) prior LTC use, and (ii) prior health care expenditures and hospital admissions to 
this basic model (section 4.3 elaborates on these variables). The full model includes 
all subgroups that were identified in the first model.  
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Third, for each subgroup that is included in the full model, we assess the impact of 
including this subgroup in the risk adjustment formula on the insurers’ incentives for 
efficiency – an additional commonly used selection criterion (see e.g. van Kleef and 
van Vliet (2010), Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) and Pope et al. (2000)). Subgroups that 
have a negative impact on the insurers’ incentives for efficiency are removed in the 
incentive compatible risk adjustment model. This third step thus sheds light on the 
tradeoff between creating incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection. 
Whether the predicted loss is stable over time – another common criterion for 
inclusion – cannot be assessed with the data set at hand.  
 
All models described above are estimated by ordinary least squares regression (OLS) 
in order to facilitate interpretation of the results (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000)
4
. 
Moreover, all current Dutch risk adjustment models use OLS, so using OLS increases 
the comparability and compatibility of these models.  
 
The subgroups based on detailed information on health status, disability and socio-
economic status from the POLS survey are too small to be included in the risk 
adjustment model. Instead, these subgroups are used as a benchmark to evaluate the 
impact of the risk adjustment model on incentives for risk selection. 
 
3.3 Variables  
In each model the dependent variable measures public LTC expenditures in 2005. In 
case the individual dies in 2005, expenditures are annualized by dividing expenditures 
by the share of the year the individual was alive. The data set provides information on 
                                               
4 Other commonly used specifications did not provide a strictly better fit than OLS. 
Results for the other specifications are available from the corresponding author. 
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the quantity of LTC that was provided in kind, which is 95% (2006) of the publicly 
financed LTC in the Netherlands
5
  (CVZ 2011). The quantities provided, i.e. days 
institutionalized or hours of home care, are multiplied by the maximum prices as set 
by the government in order to calculate expenditures; co-payments are not taken into 
account. The data contains information on institutional care for 2004 and 2005 and for 
all six types of home care for 2004. For 2005, only four out of six types of home care 
were in the data
6
. Overlapping stays in LTC institutions are only adjusted when both 
stays were in the same institution. 
 
The set of subgroups that make up the basic model are based on three demographic 
characteristics: age, gender and co-residence, i.e. whether someone lived in a single-
person household. Age and gender are the backbone of any risk-adjustment model, 
while co-residence proxies informal care availability. Informal care availability is an 
element of the eligibility assessment procedure for homecare (CIZ 2005) and formal 
LTC use is known to be correlated with informal LTC use (Bonsang 2009; Van 
Houtven and Norton 2004).  
 
The subgroups of LTC users are based on prior LTC use rather than expenditures 
because using prior LTC use as a risk adjuster still rewards insurers for negotiating 
lower prices with providers. Subgroups are created for each type of home care and 
each type of institutional care separately. Each of the subgroups of home care users 
consists of individuals who used this specific type of home care at least one hour per 
week on average. In selecting subgroups of institutional care users, we aim at 
                                               
5
 The remaining 5% consisted of cash transfers, which are not in the dataset. 
6
 Information on assistance (activerende begeleiding) and support (ondersteunende 
begeleiding) is not available. 
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balancing responsiveness to changes in LTC use against incentives for overreporting 
and oversupply resulting from the (partial) reimbursement in the future of additional 
expenditures. Therefore, for each of the four types of institutional care, four 
subgroups are generated consisting of individuals who stayed in an LTC institution 
for ≥ 1 day, 91-180 days, 181-365 days, and the entire year (366 days), respectively. 
These subgroups reflect differences in expected future costs between long-term and 
short-term residents: future costs are increasing in the number of days that the 
individual is institutionalized. Furthermore, following Van Barneveld et al. (1997), 
two subgroups are created consisting of patients who received home care and 
institutional care, respectively, on the last day of 2004. 
 
Subgroups are included for five specific HCE categories that may be related to LTC 
use: hospital and outpatient expenditures, prescription drugs, paramedical care, 
transportation, and durable medical equipment. For each of these categories, three 
subgroups are constructed: high expenditures (being in top 15%) during the last year 
(omitted for hospital and outpatient expenditures), during each of the last three years, 
and during each of the last five years. Because the data only includes HCE covered by 
sickness funds, we also include a variable indicating which persons were not insured 
through a sickness fund in one of the four years preceding 2004. If someone was no 
longer registered with a sickness fund during a year (e.g. because of losing his/her 
eligibility status due to exceeding the income threshold) and hence is not in the data 
set for the entire year, expenditures are annualized. 
 
In addition to the subgroups based on prior HCE, we also create subgroups based on 
hospital admissions because information on hospitalization and diagnosis information 
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may help to predict LTC use (Wong et al. 2010). Subgroups are based on 94 
diagnoses (based on a grouping algorithm of ICD-9 codes, see Polder et al. 2002) and 
on 48 types of treatments (based on ICD-9-CM volume 3 codes) using hospital 
admission data from 2002-2004. These data are also used to create 12 Diagnostic Cost 
Groups (DCGs). DCGs are used for risk adjustment in the Dutch health insurance 
scheme and consist of clinically homogenous inpatient diagnoses for chronic health 
problems (e.g. cancer and COPD) that have similar future HCE (Van de Ven and Ellis 
2000). Each individual is assigned to either the reference group (DCG 0) - people with 
no hospital admission or an incidental admission (e.g. fractures) - or the highest DCG 
(corresponding to the highest expected costs) that they are eligible for. Prinsze and 
Van Vliet (2007) provide an extensive description of DCGs in the Netherlands and the 
Health Insurance Regulation (Regulering van de zorgverzekering) provides the 
classification of diagnoses into DCGs (Rijksoverheid 2005)
7
 using the ICD-code of 
the main diagnosis and the medical specialty that set this diagnosis. This classification 
is then used to assign individuals to DCGs. Because the subgroups based on diagnosis 
and treatments and the DCGs overlap, we include the DCGs but not the separate 
subgroups based on diagnoses and treatments in the risk adjustment model. 
Furthermore, the impact of the DCGs on the incentives for efficiency is known to be 
limited while including all subgroups separately will provide incentives for 
oversupply and overreporting. 
                                               
7
 The assigned DCG does not match with the actual DCG for some individuals 
because of two limitations of the data set: 1. not all hospitals reported information on 
patients to the national medical registry; 2.information on two relevant ‘side 
treatments’, dialysis and artificial respiration at home was not available at all. As a 
consequence, DCG 13 (dialysis) is empty and the reference category consists of 
DCG0, DCG13 and patients who needed artificial respiration and should therefore be 
in DCG12. Furthermore, information on radiotherapy and chemotherapy was not 
specific enough to ensure that no patients who do not belong in the related DCG are 
excluded.   
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As the administrative data do not provide detailed information on personal 
characteristics, subgroups based on health, disability and socio-economic 
characteristics could only be retrieved from the smaller set of respondents that 
completed the POLS survey. Although it is much smaller and persons in nursing 
homes are not sampled, this survey information is important because it allows 
investigating incentives for insurers to use such questionnaires for risk selection 
purposes. The same subgroups are used as in De Meijer et al. (2011), who study 
determinants of LTC expenditures among the elderly, and in Stam and Van de Ven 
(2008), who identify subgroups that generate losses for health insurers. Of these 
subgroups, only those are selected for which the predicted loss deviates significantly 
from zero in the absence of risk adjustment. Because the average predicted profit 
without risk adjustment for the POLS sample and the subsample answering the health 
module are positive, the predictions for these samples are adjusted by subtracting the 
mean deviation from zero for the relevant sample multiplied by the ratio of the 
individual’s observed expenditures and the sample mean observed expenditures to 
ensure that the average predicted profit was zero. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Figure 1 and table 1 show that the distribution of LTC costs within the population is 
highly skewed. The median is at 4,598 euro; 2 out of 3 LTC users spent less than 
10,000 euro. Furthermore, there are two spikes, one at 32,000 euro (a full year of care 
in a residential home) and one at approximately 91,000 euro (a full year of care in a 
nursing home). The average cost per LTC user (15,677 euro) is much higher than the 
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average cost per user of medical care (about 2000 euro in 2004). Furthermore, LTC 
expenditures are strongly correlated with prior use of LTC: average LTC expenditures 
in 2005 are higher for home care users in 2004 than for non-users and highest for 
nursing home residents in 2004 (table 1). This finding confirms that LTC expenditures 
are quite stable over time. Table 2 shows the subgroups derived from administrative 
data that are considered for the risk adjustment formula as well as the number of 
individuals in each subgroup.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
[Table 1] 
 
4.2 Analysis 
The regression analysis reveals that the included covariates explain a large share of 
the variation in aggregate costs of LTC use in 2005: the R
2
-statistics are generally 
higher than those obtained in similar studies on medical care and mental health care 
(see e.g. van de Ven and Ellis 2000)
8
. Most of the explanatory power derives from the 
demographic variables and prior LTC use. Demographics alone contribute to an R
2
 of 
0.23. Including prior LTC use raises the R
2
-statistic to 0.73, while variables related to 
prior HCE contribute only marginally to the overall goodness of fit, regardless of 
whether prior LTC use is included. A Copas test (Copas 1983) did not detect 
overfitting. Nearly all coefficients are significant in each of the models and show the 
expected sign. The DCGs sometimes violate the monotonicity requirement: being 
assigned to a higher DCG with a more severe diagnosis does not in all cases lead to a 
                                               
8
 Appendix 1 contains descriptive statistics and all regression results. 
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higher capitation payment. This is undesirable as it generates disincentives for 
providing more care. The most prominent example is DCG 4, which includes 
diagnoses related to a cardiovascular accident, myocardial infarct, and angina pectoris 
among other things, and which has the third largest coefficient. These results highlight 
that the relationship between prior hospital stays and LTC expenditures is different 
from the relationship between prior hospital stays and HCE, on the basis of which 
these DCGs were constructed.  
 
No risk adjustment model 
In case of community rated premiums but no risk adjustment, the predicted losses 
would be very large for subgroups based on prior LTC use or based on prior health 
care expenditures (table 2)
9
. These predicted losses, together with the large size of 
most of these subgroups (last column), signal that incentives for risk selection against 
these subgroups would be huge. Other results (available upon request) show that some 
diagnoses are indicators of a persistent loss: for four diagnoses that yield a large 
predicted loss in the next year, the predicted loss is still larger than 1000 euro two 
years later and three years later. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
  
                                               
9
 The appendix contains the predicted losses for the all subgroups that were included 
in the final model, 20 subgroups based on diagnosis from information on hospital 
admissions in 2004 and subgroups that were based on the POLS survey data; results 
for other subgroups are available from the corresponding author. 
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Demographic model 
The results for the Demographic Model, which would adjust subsidies by age, gender 
and co-residence status of the enrollee, show that including demographic 
characteristics in the risk adjustment model does not sufficiently reduce the predicted 
losses for subgroups based on prior LTC use and prior HCE (table 2). Therefore, it 
seems imperative to include the latter subgroups in the risk adjustment model to 
reduce incentives for risk selection. 
 
Prior LTC model 
Including variables on prior LTC use as risk adjusters by definition reduces the 
predicted losses on these subgroups to zero. But risk adjustment based on prior LTC 
use not only reduces predicted losses for prior LTC users but also for many subgroups 
based on prior HCE. In addition, this risk-adjustment model reduces the predicted 
losses for several subgroups of individuals who were hospitalized for diagnoses that 
were associated with the highest predicted loss without risk-adjustment (table 2). 
However, it does not substantially reduce the predicted losses for subgroups of LTC 
users that are not included, e.g. individuals who used LTC on the last day of the year. 
 
Prior HCE and DCG model 
Subsequently, we examined the effect of adding information on prior health care use 
and HCE patterns in the risk adjustment formula on the predicted losses.  The 
predicted losses for the subgroups of insured that used LTC in 2004 all remain above 
the threshold of 1000 euro when DCGs are added to the model, along with variables 
indicating high expenditures (top 15%) on hospital and outpatient care for the last 
three and the last five years, and high expenditures on prescription drugs, transport, 
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and durable medical equipment for the last year, the last three and the last five years 
(table 2). But while these variables only have a small impact on the predicted loss for 
LTC users, including HCE is important for reducing the predicted loss for subgroups 
based on prior hospital admissions for several diagnoses, e.g. heart failure, and asthma 
and COPD. So whereas for some diagnoses, prior LTC use is more important in 
reducing the predicted loss, for other diagnoses prior HCE and DCGs causes the 
largest drop in the predicted losses.  
 
Full model 
When all information is combined in the full risk adjustment model, the predicted 
losses are reduced substantially for many of the subgroups we distinguished. For 
example, this full model reduces predicted losses sufficiently for all but seventeen 
diagnoses and for all but one type of treatment. Yet, including information on prior 
HCE and the variables on LTC use also leads to predicted profits larger than 1000 
euro for two diagnoses: prostate cancer and chronic ulcers of skin including decubitus. 
 
The initial predicted losses also vanish for the subgroups based on self-reported 
disability, health and socio-economic status all characteristics when prior LTC use 
and prior HCE are included in the risk adjustment formula. Although the loss is still 
larger than 1000 euro for subgroups unable able to perform at least one ADL, it is no 
longer significantly different from zero (table 2). 
 
Incentive compatible model 
All subgroups based on prior LTC use and listed in table 3 are large and generate a 
large predicted loss in the absence of risk adjustment. Some of these subgroups are 
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nonetheless excluded from the full model because their inclusion is expected to give 
insurers too strong incentives to overreport and oversupply. For example, the required 
additional spending for admitting a person for a single day in a nursing home (about 
190 euro – see appendix) is much lower than the subsequent increase in the risk-
adjusted capitation payment of 11299 euro for the subgroup of people that are 
admitted to a nursing home for 1-90 days. Table 2 shows that when an individual uses 
LTC during a given year, in the next year the insurer would be compensated for most 
of the loss if risk adjustment were based on prior LTC utilization. In addition to 
affecting the insurer’s incentives for efficiency, including prior expenditures also 
makes insurers insensitive to prices. 
 
The trade-off between incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection is also 
relevant for some subgroups based on prior HCE and health care use. For DCGs and 
subgroups with high HCE in successive years the incentive problem is expected to be 
limited (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000). But for some subgroups, most notably 
individuals with high expenditures on transportation or medical equipment, the 
inclusion criteria are set at low levels because very few individuals use these services. 
As a result, for these groups the minimum amount of expenditures is lower than the 
increase in the risk adjustment payment. Therefore, the subgroups based on only high 
expenditures in the previous year are omitted in the incentive compatible model.  
  
Leaving subgroups that were expected to compromise insurers’ incentives for 
efficiency out of the incentive compatible model had a small effect on the overall 
predictive power of the model: the incentive compatible model has an R
2
-statistic
 
of 
0.70, compared to 0.73 for the full model. A comparison of the results of the full 
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model and the incentive compatible model at the subgroups level reveals that 
removing these risk adjusters did not only affect the predicted losses for the subgroups 
that were no longer included; but it also affected the predicted losses for subgroups 
based on hospital diagnoses and treatments and for the subgroups based on detailed 
survey information on health and disability. Yet, the impact on the predicted losses for 
these other subgroups was often fairly limited. Therefore, further reduction of the 
number of subgroups in the risk adjustment model may be considered.  
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
In several countries public LTC insurance is offered by non-competing agents that are 
not at risk for providing coverage. This situation is suboptimal because it provides 
these agents with little or no incentive for efficiency and cost containment. 
Transforming or replacing these agents by insurers that bear the financial risk is easy 
but might lead to socially undesired outcomes in terms of equity and efficiency in 
absence of adequate risk adjustment. We have investigated the scope for risk selection 
and the feasibility of a LTC risk adjustment formula that sufficiently reduces 
incentives for risk selection. Our findings demonstrate that a model that is only based 
on demographic characteristics performs poorly: subgroups that may be identified 
based on their prior LTC use, prior HCE or other individual characteristics yield a 
significant predicted loss to the insurer in case of community rated premiums. 
Subsequently, we investigated the impact of 1) including individual-level information 
on prior health care and LTC use and 2) excluding risk adjusters that compromise 
insurers´ incentives for efficiency. 
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Not surprisingly, prior use of LTC services shows up as the best available predictor of 
future LTC use and hence its inclusion reduces incentives for risk selection 
substantially. Its main drawback is that it simultaneously reduces incentives for 
efficiency because insurers will be compensated for expenditures made in the 
preceding year. When more data on prior LTC use become available in the near 
future, the problem of reduced incentives for efficiency may at least partially be 
overcome by including indicators for having used (any) LTC for multiple years.  
 
Next to prior LTC use, prior HCE and inpatient diagnosis and treatment information 
also prove to be vital: predicted losses persist for certain categories of HCE and for 
some inpatient diagnoses that occur mostly among the frail elderly even when prior 
LTC use is taken into account. These diagnoses probably indicate a negative health 
shock that causes the onset or intensification of formal LTC use.  
 
Extending the model based on demographic characteristics with prior LTC use, prior 
HCE and inpatient diagnosis and treatment information does not fully eliminate the 
potential for risk selection. While the predicted losses disappear for health, disability 
and socio-economic characteristics that can be obtained from a survey, risk selection 
on the basis of some inpatient diagnoses and treatments and prior LTC use in the risk 
adjustment model remains feasible. Most of these subgroups are easy to identify for 
an insurer, e.g. patients who received short-term institutional LTC, were admitted to a 
hospital for a hip fracture, dementia-related problems or asthma or COPD, or who had 
high HCE in 2004 but not in 2003 or 2002. Yet, including these variables in the risk 
adjustment formula is not an option, as it would give insurers an incentive for 
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overprovision. This problem may partly be overcome by recalibrating the DCG for 
predicting LTC expenditures. 
 
Ideally, risk adjustment is based on data on individuals’ underlying needs for care. 
But this information is usually not included in administrative data and insurers’ LTC 
claims data. As a consequence, in the Netherlands as elsewhere, risk adjustment in 
LTC will have to rely on prior utilization and expenditure data, which is likely to not 
only reduce incentives for risk selection but also for efficiency. The risk adjustment 
model derived in this paper might nonetheless still be improved further, even with 
existing data. Incentives for risk selection may be reduced further by recalibrating the 
DCGs and by including more subgroups, e.g. based on socio-economic status and 
more specific information on prior use of durable medical equipment that indicates 
disability (see e.g. Van Kleef and Van Vliet 2011) as risk adjusters. In addition, using 
data for multiple prior years will also substantially reduce the problem of creating 
incentives for overreporting and oversupply. Most of all, our findings highlight the 
interrelatedness of elderly care, medical care and social care. Our findings show that 
to prevent risk selection, any risk adjustment formula needs to take into account the 
potential simultaneous or subsequent use of these related types of care. Consequently, 
these findings also have implications for the reverse relationship: taking into account 
prior LTC use should also be considered and studied for optimizing risk adjustment in 
health insurance. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of LTC expenditures in 2005 of LTC users in 2005 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics population 
 Mean St.dev. 
LTC expenditures in 2005 1159.18 7564.05 
LTC expenditures in 2005 conditional on any use 15677.04 23370.78 
   
LTC expenditures in 2005 if no LTC was received in 2004 93.62 1657.39 
LTC expenditures in 2005 if received home care in 2004 9673.22 18333.23 
LTC expenditures in 2005 if stayed in a residential care facility in 2004 31767.09 15902.13 
LTC expenditures in 2005 if stayed in a nursing home in 2004 61451.47 35674.80 
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Table 2: Predicted losses for selected subgroups 
 No risk 
adjustment 
Demographic 
model 
Prior LTC 
model#
 
Prior HCE 
and DCG 
model
# 
Full 
model
# 
Incentive 
compatible 
model
# 
Subgroup 
size 
Demographic information No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Prior LTC use No No Yes No Yes Yes  
Prior HCE and diagnosis information No No No Yes Yes Yes  
        
Subgroups of LTC users in prior year        
Personal care 16992* 8293*  7269*   82116 
Nursing 25799* 17183*  15303*   24727 
Nursing home: combined care 1-90 days 31009* 23310*  20888*  21005* 10546 
Nursing home: combined care 91-180 days 51350* 42482*  39803*   3853 
Nursing home: combined care 180-365 days 71408* 61349*  59290*   4359 
Nursing home: combined care 366 days 85868* 74655*  74693*   12439 
Receiving home care on last day of 2004 10078* 2459*  1669*  876* 172291 
        
Subgroups based on HCE in 2000-2004        
In top 15% in prior 3 years: hospital + outpatient care 3410* 1804* 278*    137618 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: hospital + outpatient care 4031* 2321* 393*    57597 
Expenditures on transportation in prior year 7350* 4271* 582*   916* 201609 
Expenditures on transportation in prior 3 years 9040* 5753* 353*    43615 
Expenditures on transportation in prior 5 years 8565* 5347* 374*    22462 
DCG 4, e.g. Cardiovascular accident, stroke,  angina 
pectoris 
10172* 6865* 1145*    11358 
        
Subgroups based on diagnosis information from 
2004 hospital admission data 
  
  
   
Dementia 30423* 20777* 9255* 20114* 9274* 11692* 821 
Hip fracture 21225* 12029* -950* 9167* -1229* 3205* 6433 
Chronic ulcers of skin including decubitus 13421* 8676* -224 4514* -1897* -1528* 873 
Stroke 10840* 7288* 1109* 2219* 327* 1271* 11998 
Heart failure 10054* 3806* 858* 745* 182 637* 8147 
Diabetes mellitus including diabetic complications 6478* 4633* 679* 2770* 133 231 4746 
Asthma and COPD 6128* 3721* 876* 122 -78 26 8035 
        
Subgroups from POLS health survey (n = 4619)        
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Has difficulty to/cannot perform ≥ 1 ADLd 16221* 8918* 357 7887* 289 532 90 
Cannot perform ≥ 1 ADL 23365* 13476* 1479 11906* 1409 1365 32 
*Significant at the p < 0.05 level
 
#
Cells are empty if variable is included in this extension of the risk adjustment model 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Coefficients of risk classes included in the risk-adjustment model 
 Prevalence Demographic 
model 
Prior LTC 
model
# 
Prior HCE 
and DCG 
model
# 
Full model Incentive 
compatible 
model 
Min. cost of 
prior use to 
qualify for 
subgroup 
Demographic information  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Prior LTC use  No Yes No Yes Yes  
Prior HCE and diagnosis information  No No Yes Yes Yes  
        
Female age < 50 26.43 -346* -49* -307* -46* -73*  
Female age: 50-64 9.54 327* 30* 147* -7 22*  
Female age: 65-69  2.70 929* 169* 576* 101* 154*  
Female age: 70-74  2.47 2125* 404* 1569* 317* 460*  
Female age: 75-79  2.26 4733* 928* 3937* 832* 1135*  
Female age: 80-84  1.89 9469* 1863* 8444* 1770* 2286*  
Female age: 85-89  1.13 17034* 3310* 15770* 3220* 3946*  
Female age: 90+ 0.68 27154* 4556* 25732* 4481* 5403*  
Male age < 50 31.01 0 0 0 0 0  
Male age: 50-64 12.44 188* 47* 55* 17* 22*  
Male age: 65-69  2.96 592* 210* 313* 154* 148*  
Male age: 70-74  2.51 1256* 401* 853* 329* 370*  
Male age: 75-79  1.90 2698* 793* 2106* 700* 847*  
Male age: 80-84  1.25 5473* 1460* 4671* 1350* 1678*  
Male age: 85-89  0.58 9961* 2333* 8999* 2229* 2784*  
Male age: 90+ 0.25 16478* 3005* 15384* 2924* 3631*  
Male living alone 10.63 239* -361* 213* -358* -158*  
Female living alone  11.3 2096* 72* 1917* 68* 339*  
        
≥ 1 hour per week in 2004: domestic care I 0.81  336*  318* 1534* 2360.80 
≥ 1 hour per week in 2004: domestic care II 1.87  2594*  2548* 3865* 733.20 
≥ 1 hour per week in 2004: activating support 0.06  885*  857* 1082* 1367.60 
≥ 1 hour per week in 2004: guidance 0.16  4760*  4783* 5369* 2298.40 
≥ 1 hour per week in 2004: personal care 1.44  7346*  7275* 9101* 2033.20 
≥ 1 hour per week in 2004: nursing 0.43  12079*  11840* 13502* 3088.80 
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Residential home 1-90 days 0.18  6192*  6112*                86.02 
Residential home 91-180 days 0.07  11869*  11715* 15147* 7827.82 
Residential home 181-365 days 0.13  20595**  20458* 27012* 15569.62 
Residential home 366 days 0.78  22901*  22728* 28010* 31483.32 
Nursing home: somatic care 1-90 days  0.02  11578*  11299*                188.65 
Nursing home: somatic care 91-180 days  0.01  24051*  23572* 26345* 17166.87 
Nursing home: somatic care 180-365 days 0.01  41468*  41025* 47521* 34145.09 
Nursing home: somatic care 366 days 0.02  58101*  58089* 63727* 69044.77 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 1-90 days 0.01  29897*  29773*                203.70 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 91-180 days 0.01  37814*  37798* 41849* 18535.95 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 180-365 days 0.01  54145*  54055* 59739* 36868.21 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 366 days 0.04  63126*  63206* 68788* 74551.19 
Nursing home: combined care 1-90 days 0.18  20167*  19956*                247.01 
Nursing home: combined care 91-180 days 0.07  37289*  36939* 38841* 22477.55 
Nursing home: combined care 180-365 days 0.08  59337*  59072* 63692* 44708.10 
Nursing home: combined care 366 days 0.22  78034*  78092* 83659* 90404.23 
Used home care on the last day of the year 3.01  2750*  2609*                14.10 
Used institutional care on the last day of the year 2.09  6366*  6279*                86.02 
        
In top 15% in prior year: durable medical 
equipment 
12.12   156* 79*                1 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: durable medical 
equipment 
5.78   1471* 353*  3 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: durable medical 
equipment 
3.69   1980* 370* 469* 5 
In top 15% in prior year: transportation 3.52   3780* 579*                1 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: transportation 0.76   5802* 209*  3 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: transportation 0.39   4649* 190* 670* 5 
In top 15% in prior year: paramedical care 4.30   532* -51*                1 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: paramedical care 1.60   1064* 172*  212.77 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: paramedical care 0.90   1425* 371* 471* 382.81 
In top 15% in prior year: drugs 12.26   -203* 21*                588.88 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: drugs 8.43   -84* 55*  1761.78 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: drugs 6.66   -162* 33* 64* 2743.73 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: hospital + outpatient 
care 
2.41   69* -4 96* 2096.22 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: hospital + outpatient 1.01   109* 88* 136* 3145.02 
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care 
No records available for all of the last 5 years 25.37   323* 76* 62* 0 
        
No DCG 97.60   0 0 0  
DCG 1 0.39   -883* -1518* -116*  
DCG 2 0.49   -861* -81* 243*  
DCG 3 0.25   -1070* -83* 287*  
DCG 4 0.20   5323* 986* 3373*  
DCG 5 0.31   882* 312* 953*  
DCG 6 0.19   331* 148* 689*  
DCG 7 0.13   2295* 1068* 1730*  
DCG 8 0.12   1972* 809* 1445*  
DCG 9 0.13   1772* 805* 1397*  
DCG 10 0.09   4313* 3093* 3995*  
DCG 11 0.05   4770* 3647* 4540*  
DCG 12 0.05   2154* 1635* 2327*  
        
Intercept  -3 6* -207* -36* -18*  
        
R
2
  0.23 0.73 0.24 0.73 0.70  
Number of observations  5,719,934 5,719,934 5,719,934 5,719,934 5,719,934  
*significantly different from zero at the p < 0.05 level 
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Table A2: predicted losses for subgroups of LTC users in prior year
* 
 No risk 
adjustment 
Demographic 
model 
Prior 
LTC 
model
# 
Prior HCE 
and DCG 
model
 
Full model
# 
Incentive 
compatible 
model# 
Subgroup 
size 
Demographic information No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Prior LTC use No No Yes No Yes Yes  
Prior HCE and diagnosis information No No No Yes Yes Yes  
        
Activating support 3763 3556  3080   3559 
Domestic care I 5006 -3232  -3524   46611 
Domestic care II 9753 2147  1479   107181 
Guidance 21909 11406  10617   9252 
Personal care 16992 8293  7269   82116 
Nursing 25799 17183  15303   24727 
Residential home 1-90 days 22224 11978  10488  8207 10054 
Residential home 91-180 days 34768 22153  20826   3903 
Residential home 181-365 days 36137 23203  22153   7655 
Residential home 366 days 31190 14777  14139   44726 
Nursing home: somatic care 1-90 days 24292 16859  13829  13104 1042 
Nursing home: somatic care 91-180 days 38721 30839  27338   389 
Nursing home: somatic care 181-365 days 54610 46047  42608   376 
Nursing home: somatic care 366 days 65995 56700  55923   1111 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 1-90 days 51386 41756  40013  32614 755 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 91-180 days 62188 52102  51072   385 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 180-365 days 68104 57465  56406   517 
Nursing home: psychogeriatric care 366 days 70693 58546  58887   2049 
Nursing home: combined care 1-90 days 31009 23310  20888  21005 10546 
Nursing home: combined care 91-180 days 51350 42482  39803   3853 
Nursing home: combined care 180-365 days 71408 61349  59290   4359 
Nursing home: combined care 366 days 85868 74655  74693   12439 
Receiving home care on last day of 2004 10078 2459  1669  876 172291 
Stay in LTC institution on last day of 2004  31213 21576  20881  3155 119785 
*
All reported predicted losses are significant at the p < 0.05 level; 
#
Cells are empty if this variable is included in this risk adjustment model 
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Table A3: predicted losses for subgroups based on HCE in 2000-2004* 
 No risk 
adjustment 
Demographic 
model 
Prior LTC 
model
 
Prior HCE and 
DCG model
# 
Full 
model 
Incentive 
compatible 
model
# 
Subgroup 
size 
        
Demographic information No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Prior LTC use No No Yes No Yes Yes  
Prior HCE and diagnosis information No No No Yes Yes Yes  
        
In top 15% in prior 3 years: hospital + outpatient care 3410 1804 278    137618 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: hospital + outpatient care 4031 2321 393    57597 
Expenditures on medical equipment in prior year 4108 949 185   93 693144 
Expenditures on medical equipment in prior 3 years 6524 1846 320    330813 
Expenditures on medical equipment in prior 5 years 7259 2057 326    211030 
Expenditures on transportation in prior year 7350 4271 582   916 201609 
Expenditures on transportation in prior 3 years 9040 5753 353    43615 
Expenditures on transportation in prior 5 years 8565 5347 374    22462 
Expenditures on paramedical care in prior year 2409 1319 107   53 246233 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: paramedical care 3635 2009 350    91743 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: paramedical care 4371 2338 462    51218 
In top 15% in prior year: pharmaceuticals 2832 572 130   28 701221 
In top 15% in prior 3 years: pharmaceuticals 3215 678 140    482222 
In top 15% in prior 5 years: pharmaceuticals 3448 742 147    381160 
No prior HCE available -445 25 17    1450876 
DCG 1 2080 -272 -1474    22198 
DCG 2 1921 466 117    27820 
DCG 3 2400 349 117    14018 
DCG 4 10172 6865 1145    11358 
DCG 5 5109 2189 471    17981 
DCG 6 3821 1346 276    10586 
DCG 7 4595 3512 1215    7391 
DCG 8 6187 3881 1033    7027 
DCG 9 4787 3231 978    7459 
DCG 10 7602 5840 3275    5365 
DCG 11 7461 6220 3823    2939 
DCG 12 5275 3536 1805    2684 
*All reported predicted losses are significant at the p < 0.05 level; 
#
Cells are empty if the variable is included in this risk adjustment model 
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Table A4: Predicted losses for subgroups based on diagnosis information from 2004 hospital admission data 
Diagnosis in 2004 No risk 
adjustment 
Demographic 
model 
Prior LTC 
model
# 
Prior HCE and 
DCG model
# 
Full 
model 
Incentive 
compatible model 
Subgroup 
size 
        
Demographic information No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Prior LTC use No No Yes No Yes Yes  
Prior HCE and diagnosis information No No No Yes Yes Yes  
        
10 diagnoses with the highest initial predicted loss        
Dementia 30423* 20777* 9255* 20114* 9274* 11692* 821 
Hip fracture 21225* 12029* -950* 9167* -1229* 3205* 6433 
Parkinson's disease 21093* 17566* 6486* 13817* 5730* 7650* 510 
Chronic ulcers of skin including decubitus 13421* 8676* -224 4514* -1897* -1528* 873 
Stroke 10840* 7288* 1109* 2219* 327* 1271* 11998 
Septicaemia 10620* 7322* 1100* 4277* 592 2330* 679 
Heart failure 10054* 3806* 858* 745* 182 637* 8147 
Pancreas cancer 9584* 7556* 6316* 2605* 3525* 3469* 329 
Osteoporosis 9334* 4590* 1002* 2710* 662* 1660* 1598 
Acute renal and urinary infections 8908* 5452* 1252* 3420* 954* 1798* 3942 
        
10 diagnosis with the highest initial predicted loss 
for which the incentive compatible model 
sufficiently reduced the predicted loss  
       
Heart failure 10054* 3806* 858* 745* 182 637* 8147 
Diseases of the blood and bloodforming organs 8139* 3713* 1191* 1718* 494* 755* 6814 
Diabetes mellitus including diabetic complications 6478* 4633* 679* 2770* 133 231 4746 
Stomach cancer 6148* 3900* 2673* -290 368 553 664 
Asthma and COPD 6128* 3721* 876* 122 -78 26 8035 
Nephritis and nephropathy 5579* 3906* 535* 767* -189 128 2117 
Esophagus cancer 5429* 3768* 2184* -1207 -725 -343 426 
Colorectal cancer 5416* 2438* 1095* -20* 235 464 3975 
Other endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 4504* 2829* 761* 1440* 474* 849* 8510 
Congenital anomalies of nervous system 4082 2558 181 546 -239 -229 50 
* Significant at the p < 0.05 level; bold numbers indicate whether including prior LTC use or prior HCE and diagnosis information decreased the 
predicted loss most. Results for subgroups based on primary treatment information from 2004 and from earlier years and for subgroups based on 
primary diagnoses from earlier years available upon request 
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Table A5: predicted losses for subgroups based on the General Survey of Living Conditions (POLS) 2004 
 No risk 
adjustment 
Demographic 
model 
Prior 
LTC 
model
# 
Prior HCE and 
DCG model
# 
Full model Incentive 
compatible 
model 
Subgroup size Prevalence
a 
Demographic information  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Prior LTC use  No Yes No Yes Yes   
Prior HCE and diagnosis information  No No Yes Yes Yes   
         
From POLS survey (n = 9098)         
Self-rated health: bad 4591* 3167* 421 2443* 294 613 482 6.19 
Long-term illness 1185* 380 32 186 -5 49 2927 37.6 
Education: low 1314* 193 9 166 8 72 2616 33.95 
Education: high -834* -245* -20 -240* -23 -86 1006 13.05 
GALI problems
b
 2912* 1405* 134 986* 67 200 1327 17.05 
Income: lowest quartile 661* 488* 95 474* 91 119 1936  
Income: highest quartile -743* -33 -1 6 3 -12 1945  
         
From POLS survey (n = 4619)         
Specialist visit in 2004 679* 157 11 -7 -19 -76 1584 43.77 
Use of pharmaceuticals in prior 14 days 1039* 265 -158 25 -207 -294* 476 13.16 
Physiotherapy 1042* 738* -9 509 -36 -40 738 20.39 
At least 1 chronic disease 270 111 63 101 60 10 5892 34.33 
At least 2 chronic diseases 362* 223 86 218 85 46 5260 12.59 
Blindness 638 -318 -189 -442 -209 -258 536 17.96 
Deafness 1370* -148 -124 -176 -134 -144 466 15.66 
Diabetes 1509 -670 -60 -1153 -129 -320 121 4.05 
Cancer 2621* 968 -26 588 -122 -319 181 6.07 
Stroke 4349* 1404 -64 1161 -165 -302 108 3.61 
Blood pressure 1801* 204 34 133 0 -53 405 13.5 
Ciculatory system 2848* 466 -145 -146 -246 -477 77 2.57 
Urinary incontinence 3131* 1283 683 911 631 688 166 5.53 
Osteoarthritis 1649* -126 -78 -266 -105 -124 445 14.82 
Arthritis 2025* 451 -61 315 -98 -75 191 6.37 
At least 1 ailment 198 -107 -66 -152 -77 -128* 1659 21.3 
At least 2 ailments 752* -49 -133 -167 -157 -194 917 11.77 
PCS-12
c
 score < 30 3746* 1834 -308 1326 -397 -219 208 7.62 
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Has difficulty to/cannot perform ≥ 1 ADLd 16221* 8918* 357 7887* 289 532 90 7.45 
Cannot perform ≥ 1 ADL  23365* 13476* 1479 11906* 1409 1365 32 2.65 
Has difficulty to/cannot perform ≥ 1 mobility 
task 
9346* 3627* 212 2953* 156 37 195 16.28 
Cannot perform ≥ 1 mobility task 15394* 7247* 464 6225* 388 656 69 5.76 
*Predicted loss is not significant at the p < 0.05 level 
a
Prevalence among respondents for whom this characteristic is not missing 
b
Global Activity Limitation Indicator (van Oyen et al. 2006) 
c
Physical Component Scale (Ware et al. 1996) 
d
Activity of daily living: dressing; walking across a room; bathing; eating; getting in / out of bed; using the toilet (Katz and Akpom 1976) 
 
 
